This paper models settlement arrangements between international telecommunication carriers. The FCC in the U.S. claims these arrangements cost U.S. consumers billions of dollars annually, largely to subsidize foreign carriers in low-income countries. A model is given which m a k es sense of this claim, as well as the role of costs, competition, and income disparities in settlement rate determination. Findings are tested using data spanning 17 years and 167 countries. Some implications are drawn for the FCC's recently proposed settlement rate caps, as well as for proposals for multilateral solutions.
Introduction
The world market for international telecommunications is large and growing rapidly. In 1995, the world made more than 60 billion minutes of international phone calls. In 1996, the annual growth in the top ve routes averaged over 15. Despite this, and the important role telecommunication services play in communication and information related industries, there has been surprisingly little academic analysis of the arrangements which g o vern international telecommunications pricing. 1 These arrangements can be traced back to 1865, when twenty European nations came together to form a Union, which is now known as the International Telecommunications Union ITU. They conceptualized international telecommunications as a jointly provided service; an international phone call utilizes the services of a telephone company a t e a c h e n d . According to this view, the revenue should be shared between the two carriers providing the service. However, in practice, the revenue of a call is collected by the telephone company in the country where the call is originated, and this can di er across countries when demand levels di er. This suggests that carriers ought t o h a ve some way of compensating each other, in the case there is an imbalance of calls between them. The method of payment they chose was a negotiated xed rate per minute, commonly referred to as the settlement rate, which applied to the imbalance of calls between the two carriers. 2 This apparently innocous arrangement, to share the revenue from international phone calls through settlement rates, has had far reaching implications for consumer welfare. In 1996, U.S. carriers paid out in the order of US$5.5 billion more in such settlements than they received. The Federal Communications Commission FCC estimates that two-thirds of this amount represents a subsidy from American consumers to foreign telephone companies. Moreover, they claim that arti cially high settlement rates are preventing the price of international phone calls falling to competitive l e v els. From the start of 1999, the FCC plans to impose price caps on the rates U.S. carriers can pay for calls terminated overseas, a policy that has met sti opposition from carriers in other countries especially those in developing countries. In this paper, we t r y to understand what determines settlement rates, both theoretically and empirically. In doing so, we address the question: Why do American consumers subsidize foreign telephone companies? We also explore a variety of concerns regarding the FCC's proposed price caps.
We start by d e v eloping a simple model of international telecommunication pricing and settlement rates, under various assumptions about competition. Our model builds on the model introduced by Carter and Wright 1994 . One of the key results of their paper is that retail prices increase with settlement rates. This arises because the settlement rate is a component of the marginal cost of the originating carrier providing its service. Thus, the settlement rate is not innocous. 3 We obtain the same result, but explicitly explore its implications for the setting of settlement rates and retail prices when there is an asymmetry in demand between the countries. 4 Without competition in either country, the model predicts that settlement r a t e s will be set above the marginal cost of incoming calls to the extent there are di erences in costs and per-capita income between the two c o u n tries. To understand this later result, note that subscribers in a high-income country U.S. will tend to make more outgoing calls to a low-income country China than vice-versa. This generates an imbalance in calls between the two c o u n tries, so that the U.S. carrier wants a low or negative settlement rate and the Chinese carrier wants a high settlement r a t e . Starting from a point of cost-based settlement rates, the U.S. carrier earns greater pro ts from the higher levels of demand, and thus stands to lose more if it does not reach an agreement with the Chinese carrier. For this reason, the outcome of bargaining is to share some of the U.S. carriers pro ts with the Chinese carrier. This is achieved by agreeing on a settlement rate above the cost of carrying additional incoming calls. A high settlement rate raises the marginal cost of U.S. carriers providing outgoing calls, and hence leads to higher consumer prices. Essentially, U.S. consumers are subsidizing foreign telephone companies in low-income countries.
We explore through simulations how these results hold up when competition is introduced between the U.S. carriers, and in the case where there is competition in both countries. Introducing competition to the U.S. has two main e ects. Firstly, competition in the U.S. lowers U.S. prices which further accentuates the asymmetry in demand between the U.S. and low-income countries, increasing the settlement rate. Secondly, since the retail price in the U.S. is no longer the full monopoly mark-up, U.S. carriers and the foreign carrier bene t from a higher settlement rate, as this pushes prices back u p to monopoly levels. Our simulation results suggest after the introduction of competition in the U.S., the settlement rate and the foreign retail price increase while retail prices in the U.S. fall and the imbalance in settlement p a yments is worsened. However, introducing competition to the U.S. does not change our basic result, that settlement rates are increasing in income disparity, a s w ell as in the costs of providing incoming calls.
In the case where competition is introduced in both countries, the asymmetry in demand is not di erent from the monopoly case, yet both countries prefer a higher common settlement rate to increase retail prices to monopoly levels. In this case, the settlement rate can be used as a legitimate instrument of collusion between carriers, since prices are increasing in the settlement rate. We p r o vide simulation results which suggest such collusion will lead to very high levels of settlement rates, although re-tail prices will generally be lower than the monopoly case. We argue this collusive outcome is only likely to be sustainable in the situation where rules, such as common settlement rate requirements and proportional return, are enforced, and where alternative forms of competition such as settlement r a t e b ypass are prevented. Without these restrictions, competitive pressures are likely to drive d o wn settlement rates towards the marginal cost of incoming calls. In this regard, we also discuss some other forms of competition which a ect the level of settlement rates; namely settlement rate bypass, alternative routing, and call-back services.
Our model sheds light on the FCC's proposed rules. The FCC has detailed benchmarks which g o vern the maximal settlement rates that U.S. carriers may p a y foreign carriers to terminate international tra c originating in the U.S. The principle behind these rules is to bring settlement rates, and therefore retail prices, more closely in line with costs, thus reducing settlement imbalances between the U.S. and these countries, and increasing overall e ciency. This principle is consistent with the ndings from our modelling. When settlement rates are set at the marginal cost of carrying incoming calls, rather than on the carriers relative bargaining power, retail prices are lower, e ciency is increased, and the imbalance in settlement payments is reduced. We nd the bene ts of moving to cost-based settlement rates are largest when there is competition in the U.S. but no competition in the foreign country, and the greater the di erence in income levels across the two countries. However, our model casts some doubt on whether these rules will be e ective. According to our model, since the underlying bargaining problem remains unchanged, so should the outcome to bargaining. It is not obvious how the FCC rules will enable U.S. carriers to unilaterally achieve l o wer settlement rates in negotiation with foreign carriers.
Our model also has implications for a multilateral approach to settlement r a t e d etermination. Any individual country, except the highest and lowest income countries, pro ts from, as well as su ers costs caused by high settlement rates. However, by acting multilaterally, e a c h country expect those with the lowest income will bene t from a simultaneous lowering of settlement rates. This suggests there is an ine ciency generated by e a c h country forming agreements in a bilateral fashion. We discuss the merits of a multilateral approach, as well as the role competition might p l a y i n a n y proposed solution.
Using data on settlement payments, call volumes, and prices, between the U.S. and other countries, from 1980-1996, we test some of the predicitons of our model. We nd support for the proposition that retail prices are increasing in the settlement rate; a $1 increase in the settlement rate increases the retail price by 5 1 c e n ts. Statistically, this is not signi cantly di erent from 50 cents which is the prediction of our model when there is no competition, but is highly signi cantly di erent from zero. We also nd support for the proposition that the settlement rate is increasing in the income disparity b e t ween the U.S. and the foreign country. Assuming no competition in the foreign country, an increase in income disparity of $1000 in 1985 increases the settlement rate by 5.6 cents. The positive relationship between income disparity and settlement rates is highly statistically signi cant across all years, although the magnitude of the relationship has weakened with the onset of domestic and foreign competition.
As well as income, proxies for the per-minute costs of providing submarine cables between countries distance and population and a proxy for the per-minute cost of the national link area of the country are important determinants of settlement rates, although their importance has diminished over time. Our estimates suggest that for every 1000 kilometres between the U.S. and the foreign country, the settlement rate increases by 19.3 cents in 1980, 5.1 cents in 1988, and 3.2 cents in 1996. If economies of scale are present, the per-minute cost of calls between the U.S. and a foreign country will also depend on the population of the foreign country. Our results suggest this is indeed the case. For every 1 increase in population, the settlement rate decreases by 27.4 cents in 1980, 5.2 cents in 1988, and 0.4 cents in 1996. Finally, a component of the per-minute cost of covering incoming calls is the cost of providing the national link carrying the call within the country and delivering it to the customer. We use the area of a country as one measure of this cost, and nd that for every 1 increase in area, the settlement rate increases by 10.7 cents in 1980, 3.4 cents in 1988, and 0.6 cents in 1996. These results are consistent with the idea that the distance related costs, as we l l a s a n y xed costs of providing international service, haven fallen dramatically over this period. They also re ect a fall in the per-minute costs resulting from these costs being shared over a growing number of calls. A third factor emphasized by our model, in addition to income and costs, is competition. Greater competition in the U.S. and foreign countries, generally decreases settlement rates, although the empirical results for foreign competition are somewhat mixed.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a m o d e l o f i n ternational telecommunications, considering the cases of no competition, competition only in the U.S., and competition in both countries. In light of these results, we discuss the case for some of the proposed solutions to high settlement rates in Section 3. Section 4 details out data set. Our estimation results are presented in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes with some policy implications and future directions.
A Model of International Telecommunications
A critical assumption in modelling settlement rates and pricing for international phone calls is the degree of competition in the market for these services. The following sections make di erent assumptions about the degree of competition, as well as income disparity and costs, to determine their impact on settlement rates, retail prices, carrier pro ts, and settlement i m balances.
Model without Competition
Suppose there are n countries and each c o u n try is serviced by a single telecommunications company, referred to here as a carrier. Customers can call n,1 other countries. Suppose there are N i customers in country i and de ne N = P n j=1 N j . Then the number of customers in countries i and j who connect with each other is assumed to be proportional to N i N j =N. where c ij is the marginal cost of outgoing calls incurred by carrier i for calls made between country i and j, and d ij is the marginal cost of incoming calls incurred by carrier i for calls made between country j and i. The agreed common settlement rate, denoted by r j , is the price per minute that carrier i pays carrier j for any n e t imbalance of calls outgoing from country i or vice-versa. We assume symmetry between any two countries, except in the level of income and in costs. Thus, we assume a ji = a ij ; b ji = b ij :
As a rst approximation, this assumption is reasonable. The preference for calls between any two countries is likely to be roughly symmetric, other things equal. On average, people who call each other to have a conversation are likely to get similar bene ts from the phone call. Given the separable structure of the pro t function above, we analyze the case between country i and j without reference to other countries that is, we f o c u s o n ij hereafter.
Each r m i is assumed to choose its prices p ij to maximize pro ts which amounts to choosing p ij to maximize ij for each c o u n try j. The resulting pro t maximizing price is p ij = 1 2b ij + c ij 2 + r j 2 :
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The most important thing to note about this result is that prices are increasing in the settlement rate; carriers pass on one-half of any c hange in settlement rates to retail prices. Essentially, the settlement rate becomes part of the marginal cost of outgoing calls. Even if t h e r e i s n o n e t imbalance in calls, settlement rates still matter, since they alter the marginal incentive of carriers to change their retail price. By lowering its retail price, a carrier will start paying net settlement p a yments; the level of which depends on the level of the settlement rate. Thus, a high settlement rate reduces the incentive f o r a c a r r i e r t o l o wer its retail price. We now consider how these settlement rates are determined. Suppose carriers choose a common settlement rate r j to maximize the joint pro t between them. the intuitive notion that customers in the high-income country will make more calls to their friends and family in the low-income country than vice-versa. Hence with an imbalance in calls, the carrier in the low-income country would like a high common settlement rate and the carrier in the high-income country would like a l o w or negative common tari . From this equation, it can be seen that when both countries have the same income, the pro t maximzing common settlement rate is equal to marginal cost of carrying incoming calls d ij ; that is, both carriers agree on the joint pro t maximizing point. However, when the two countries have di erent incomes, then the preferred common settlement rate will di er across countries, and a bargaining problem will ensue. A bargaining problem will also ensue when there are cost di erences across countries, even if income levels are the same. In this case,
and the carrier with higher costs will prefer higher settlement rates. This occurs not just from the direct a ect of higher costs of carrying incoming calls, but also because when the costs of outgoing calls are higher, retail prices will be higher, causing an imbalance in calls.
While the results so far show there is con ict over the common settlement rate, and say something about the nature of this con ict, they do not imply the likely outcome of this con ict is a ected by the income level and the costs of the countries. This is what we n o w s h o w. To demonstrate this, we r s t h a ve to specify how r m s agree on a common settlement rate. We assume this bilateral bargaining process can be characterized by the Nash bargaining solution r N B S j , which is known to have reasonable properties. It is found as follows max rj Pr j where Pr j = ij r j ji r j :
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The disagreement point for this bargaining game is taken as the case no settlement agreeement is reached between the two carriers so they cannot provide international service between the two countries and both their pro ts are zero. This is the ultimate threat both parties have. 6 If the two carriers, through cooperation over a common settlement rate, can achieve jointly higher pro ts, they will do so, and the disagreement pro t levels will in uence how these higher pro t levels are shared. Starting from a point of cost-based settlement rates, the rm that earns greater pro ts from having higher levels of demand or lower costs, stands to lose more if it does not reach an agreement with the other rm. For this reason, the outcome of bargaining is for the carrier in the high-income low-cost country to share some of its pro ts with the carrier in the low-income country high-cost country. This is achieved by agreeing on a settlement r a t e a b o ve the cost of carrying additional incoming calls, as we n o w The rst term in 10 is a weighted average of the marginal cost of incoming calls. If both countries have the same income and carriers have the same outgoing costs, then q ij = q ji and ij = ji , so the second term in 10 will be zero, and the settlement rate is equal to a weighted average of the marginal costs of incoming calls. If income or outgoing costs di er across countries, then in general q ij 6 = q ji and ij 6 = ji , so the second term in 10 will not be zero, and the settlement rate will diverge from the marginal cost of incoming calls. We w ant t o s h o w that this divergence is in the positive direction. Because both rms must earn positive pro ts, the second term will be positive p r o vided ij ji whenever q ij q ji and ij ji whenever q ij q ji .
We consider three cases. and the second term in 10 will be zero. This also implies @q j i @p j i = @q ij @p ij and ij ji . Thus in 10 greater weight is placed on d ij compared to d ji . This leads to the conclusion that: When the only di erence between countries is a di erence in the marginal cost of incoming calls, the settlement rate will be greater than the average marginal cost of incoming calls. The assumption that ij ji and the conclusion that 0
are inconsistent with 7. Thus it must be that ij ji , which from 10 leads to the conclusion that: When the only di erence b etween countries is a di erence in the marginal cost of outgoing calls, the settlement rate is set above the marginal cost of incoming calls.
Case 3: m ij m ji and d ij = d ji ; c ij = c ji : Equation 3 implies p ij = p ji , so m ij m ji implies q ij q ji . The proof then follows exactly as in the proof of case 2, so that: When the only di erence b etween countries is a di erence in incomes, the settlement rate is set above the marginal cost of incoming calls. 7 A higher settlement rate leads to higher consumer prices from equation 3. In this case, imbalances in settlement p a yments will be linked with higher settlement r a t e s and higher prices. Table 1 presents the results of simulations using four di erent levels of foreign income and three di erent levels of foreign costs. These simulations illustrate the theoretical ndings above. As the disparity b e t ween the U.S. and the foreign country's income increases, so does the settlement rate, the retail prices, and the settlement i m balance. When SD ij is a positive n umber, the carrier in country i the U.S. pays out more in settlements to the carrier in country j than vice-versa.
Competition in the U.S.
The U.S. was the rst country to allow competition in its international telecommunications market. Despite MCI's entry in 1985 and the subsequent undercutting of AT&T's price, it took until 1990 for MCI to achieve a 12.5 market share; AT&T's market share was still over 80. That all consumers did not switch immediately to MCI, despite its slightly lower price, suggests the appropriate model of competition between carriers is one of product di erentiation, rather than one of perfect competition. Carriers may b e d i e r e n tiated by their marketing strategies, the associated services they provide, the quality of their customer service, or di erences in their credit and billing practices. An alternative motivation for our model of product di erentiation is switching costs. Once they belong to one carrier, consumers will not switch to the other carrier unless the price advantage is su cient to outweigh the costs of switching, which include the search costs of evaluating which carrier is cheaper. This suggests consumers will have a bias towards the incumbent. Switching costs also suggest each carrier will have some market power. We use a Hotelling model of product di erent i a t i o n a s a s i m p l e w ay to capture these various aspects. 9 We assume the parameter i in the consumers indirect utility function depends on the choice of carrier. Suppose there are two carriers in the U.S., carriers a and b.
Then suppose a i = 1 , x= i + = i and b i = x= i , where x measures a particular consumer's taste for each carrier, and x is distributed uniformly between 0 and 1. The parameter i measures the degree of product di erentiation and so determines the degree of competition. If i is high, then consumers are not as concerned about the bene ts of using a particular carrier as they are about the price di erential between the two companies. The parameter measures any brand loyalty t o wards carrier a.
In the case = 0 , there is no brand loyalty corresponding to low switching costs.
Alternatively, i f = 1 , then carrier b will only attract customers if it charges a lower price than carrier a corresponding to high switching costs. We denote the prices charged by carriers a and b, p a ij and p b ij for calls made between country i and j. We solve for the market share of carrier a, b y nding the consumer which is just indi erent between the two carriers. We have assumed a common settlement rate for the two U.S. carriers r j . We have also assumed that the market for terminating foreign-billed international tra c is divided up in proportion to the U.S. carrier's own share of domestic-billed international tra c with the corresponding country. This follows the rules that the FCC has established. 10 Such rules are called proportional return rules, and international tra c that ows under such rules is known as settled tra c. These rules were introduced orginally to prevent U.S. carriers competing against each other for call settlement, when dealing with a monopoly foreign carrier. Such competition could decrease the bargaining power of the U.S. carriers, shifting even greater levels of their revenue oshore. It could also lead the incumbent U.S. carrier to reach an exclusive deal with the foreign carrier, to prevent e n try of other carriers into the U.S. market wipsawing. We suppose that the two U.S. carriers act jointly in bargaining over the common settlement rate with the foreign country. In doing so, we assume they act as if they were a single carrier. The bargaining process is again assumed to be determined by the Nash Bargaining solution, with the disagreement point being zero pro ts. The Nash bargaining solution r N B S j is found as the solution to the following maximization problem: Introducing competition to the U.S. has two main e ects. Firstly, competition in the U.S. lowers U.S. prices which further accentuates the asymmetry in demand between the U.S. and poorer countries, causing the U.S. to want e v en lower settlement rates and poorer countries to want e v en higher settlement rates. Secondly, since the retail price in the U.S. is no longer the full monopoly mark-up, U.S. carriers and the foreign carrier bene t from a higher settlement rate, as this pushes prices back up to monopoly levels. Our simulation results suggest that after the introduction of competition in the U.S., the settlement rate and the foreign retail price increase while retail prices in the U.S. fall, worsening the imbalance in settlement payments. One way to see this, is to note that settlement rates are well above costs, even when there is no income di erential across countries. Table 2 presents the results of simulations using two di erent levels of foreign income, three di erent levels of foreign costs, and two di erent levels of U.S. competition. The simulations also con rm there is still a link between income disparity and settlement rates, and the relationship between settlement rates and retail prices remains much the same as before, as does the relationship between costs and settlement rates. Table 1 . In addition, = 0 :5 and s ij is the share of U.S. customers that use carrier a in the U.S.
Competition in the U.S. and the Foreign Country
In this subsection we consider what happens once competition is introduced to both the U.S. and the foreign country. Once competition exists in both countries, rules such as proportional return and a requirement o f common settlement rates, may impede rather than enhance competition. In particular, these rules prevent carriers from undercutting each other in the rates they o er foreign carriers for call settlement, instead allowing them to collude over a common settlement r a t e . Such collusion can be used as a way t o k eep retail prices high, despite independent retail competition. 11 Because of this, when competition exists in the foreign country, a s w ell as in the U.S., the FCC has recently taken a di erent view on competition for call settlement. 12 Without the restrictions of proportional return and common settlement rates, domestic carriers can undercut each other by o ering lower settlement rates so as to be chosen by foreign carriers to terminate their outgoing calls. Coalitions can form between domestic and foreign carriers to internalize any a b o ve-cost settlement rates, enabling such coalitions to lower retail prices and better compete against rival coalitions. In fact, with only two competing carriers in each o f t h e t wo c o u n tries, there are 15 possible coalitions that can be formed.
In one extreme, all four carriers could form a coalition and negotiate settlement rates in a cooperative fashion. The idea would be to agree on high settlement rates, so as to keep retail prices high despite independent retail competition. However, such an agreement is necessarily fragile; two or three of the carriers could break away forming their own coalition and raising their own pro t at the expense of the excluded carriers. 13 In the other extreme, each carrier o ers to settle calls at a rate it determines independently, and carriers choose to have their calls completed by t h e carrier o ering the lowest such rate. The outcome in this case, is that settlement r a t e s will be set at the marginal cost of carrying incoming calls. Retail prices will then be a mark-up on the cost of incoming and outgoing calls. As competition in the retail market approaches perfect competition no product di erentiation, retail prices will be competed down to the marginal cost of carrying calls.
If there are more than two carriers in each country, the number of potential coalitions which can be formed multiples very quickly; with three carriers in each c o u n try there are 63 possible coalitions; with four carriers in each country there are 255 possible coalitions. In this case, cooperative arrangements are less likely to be sustainable, and settlement rates will more likely be competed down to the marginal cost of incoming calls. Moreover, as more carriers emerge in each c o u n try, retail competition will intensify and retail price mark-ups will diminish.
The sustainability of cooperative arrangements which involve above-cost settlement rates is further weakened by new forms of competition which have received considerable attention in recent times; namely settlement r a t e b ypass, re le, and callback services. In the case of settlement r a t e b ypass, the international settlement rate system is bypassed altogether by a private line, in which a carrier provides the entire international link between the two c o u n tries. This is particularly e ective in putting downward pressure on settlement rates if the carrier can easily and cheaply obtain domestic call completion. This is likely to be the case for foreign carriers who want to provide a phone service to the United States. However, this is unlikely to be the case for U.S. carriers want i n g t o p r o vide a service to a foreign country which has no competition. In this case, the foreign carrier may not provide access to its national lines, and so settlement r a t e b ypass may actually accentuate the asymmetry between the U.S. and countries not subject to competition, thus raising negotiated settlement rates. In contrast, when domestic competition exists in the foreign country, a U.S. carrier should be able to reach an agreement with one of the carriers to bypass the settlement rate system, thus putting downward pressure on settlement rates and prices. This is another reason settlement rates and retail prices are likely to be lower in foreign countries with competition.
Two other forms of competition re le and call-back services arise from arbitrage opportunities caused by international call prices and settlement rates being set in non-competitive w ays. According to Ergas 1998, These pressures are, in particular, more e ective in eliminating anomalies in the structure of rates than in forcing down the average level of those rates. Re le, or alternative routing, is the re-routing of an international call through an intermediate country. This is done when the combined settlement cost of the two separate links is less than the direct link between the two countries. A more interesting form of arbitrage is call-back. Call-back rms exploit arbitrage opportunities between retail prices in the originating country and the wholesale price in the U.S., re-routing calls that originate in a high-price country, vis the U.S. This involves the caller from the high-price country being called back from the U.S. and connected to the person they are calling, who is also called from the U.S. This increases the imbalance in calls between the two c o u n tries, and could actually lead to an increase in the settlement rate in the high-price country; both Ergas 1998 and Manenti 1997 argue that this is the likely outcome. O setting this outcome is the possibility that both re le and call-back can be used to undermine or destabilize cooperative arrangements that attempt to maintain high settlement rates, thus putting further downward pressure on settlement rates when there is more than one carrier in each c o u n try.
In summary, comeptition can, in many cases, put strong pressure on settlement rates and prices to fall to cost based levels, but in some cases, particularly when proportional return and common settlement rate requirements remain in place, competition may not be as e ective, as high settlement rates are used to o set the e ects of this competition on retail prices. In Section 4, we sort out the role competition plays in settlement rate determination, from an empirical perspective. We rst analyze two policy suggestions in light of the above results.
The FCC Benchmarks and Mulilateral Negotiated Solutions
The FCC has recently detailed benchmarks which govern the maximal settlement rates that U.S. carriers may pay foreign carriers to terminate international tra c originating in the U.S. 14 The principle behind these rules is to bring settlement rates, and therefore retail prices, more closely in line with costs, thus reducing the settlement imbalances between the U.S. and these countries, hence increasing overall e ciency. Table 3 presents the percentage changes in prices, pro ts, the settlement imbalance, and overall e ciency, when settlement rates are changed from the Nash bargaining solution to the marginal costs of incoming calls d ij = d ji = 0 :1. This is 14 In U.S. dollars, these are $0.15 for upper-income countries, $0.19 for upper-middle income countries, $0.19 for lower-middle income countries, and $0.23 for lower-income countries. These are to be implemented by the start of 1999 for upper-income countries, 2000 for upper-middle income countries, 2001 for lower-middle income countries, 2002 for lower-income countries, and 2003 for countries with teledensity less than one. In 1997, the average settlement rate U.S. carriers paid their foreign correspondents weighted by t o t a l m i n utes of outgoing calls was roughly $0.35, and the unweighted average was more than twice this. done for four di erent l e v els of foreign income and with three di erent assumptions about competition. 15 When settlement rates are set at the marginal cost of carrying incoming calls, rather than on the carriers relative bargaining power, retail prices are lower, e ciency is increased, and the imbalance in settlement payments is reduced. We nd that the bene ts of moving to cost-based settlement rates are largest when there is competition in the U.S. but no competition in the foreign country, a n d the greater the di erence in income levels across the two countries. These results provide a model-based justi cation for why t h e F CC would like to see settlement rates reduced to levels close to the costs of the services provided. A more challenging question is, How can the FCC enforce its mandates and unilaterally reduce settlement rates in its favor? One interpretation of the FCC mandate, in terms of our model, is that it changes the bargaining set that these carriers can legally agree on. Given that the U.S. carriers are only allowed to pay settlement rates that lie below t h e b e n c hmarks mandated by t h e F CC, any agreed outcome will have to satisfy this property. However, if foreign governments are not willing to accept these mandates, then the alternatives are either that there is no settlement agreement which could mean the breakdown of international service, or the FCC will have t o d o an about face on its benchmark rates. This suggests that the underlying bargaining problem is unchanged by t h e FCC rules. Nevertheless, to the extent the rules gain international acceptance, they may p u t m ultilateral pressure on high settlement rate regimes, which could enhance the bargaining power of U.S. carriers.
To explore a multilateral approach to settlement rate determination further, note that a carrier in a middle-income country may accept lower settlement rates with carriers in high-income countries, if this allowed it to also achieve l o wer settlement rates with carriers in low-income countries. This suggests most countries could be better o if all settlement rates were reduced simultaneously. Bilateral negotiations between carriers create an ine ciency, w h e r e b y all countries are worse o , with the exception of the country with the lowest income. To illustrate this point, we consider the e ects of moving to cost based settlement rates for a group of four countries with incomes 0:25, 0:5, 0:75, and 1, assuming no competition in each country, and the same parameter values as Table 1 . With four countries, there will be six bilateral settlement rates, and we consider the impact of forcing all six settlement rates to be based on the marginal cost of incoming calls.
From Table 3 , it can be seen that governments in middle-income countries interpreted as m j = 0:5 and m j = 0:75 have little incentive to unilaterally require lower settlement rates with high-income countries, since there is almost no e ciency gain and the carriers pro ts are reduced substantially. Given that in middle-income countries carrier pro ts are valued more highly by the government than consumer surplus, cost-based settlement rates may not be preferred. 16 The low-income country m j = 0 :25 will certainly not force its carriers to unilaterally switch to cost-based settlement rates with the high-income country; doing so achieves lower overall e ciency, and in particular, dramatically lower carrier pro ts. However, when all settlement rates are simultaneously reduced to cost, all four countries achieve e ciency gains, these being 18, 12, 7, and 1. Notice the e ciency gains for middle-income countries are now quite sizeable, and even the lowincome country achieves a small e ciency gain. Moreover, now the upper-middle income country m j = 0 :75 increases its carrier pro ts by 8 and the lower-middle income country m j = 0 :5 l o wers it carrier pro ts by o n l y 4 . For such a proposal to be implementable, the lowest income country will probaby still need to receive some compensation. Despite a small overall e ciency gain, the loss of carrier pro ts is likely to be valued more by the government than the gain in consumer surplus for such a country. Without some compensation it would not agree to these lower rates. No agreement means the bene ts to the lower-middle income country will no longer be present and so the whole process of mutual bene ts unravels. 17
Data
To examine the determinants of settlement rates in practice, we obtained annual data on all available countries, for the period 1980-1996. This is an unbalanced sample of 16 Carriers in low and middle income countries are typically government-owned monopolies that value pro ts more highly than consumer surplus. This re ects the high cost of raising tax revenue in such c o u n tries and the view that international phone calls are luxury goods. 17 The need for such compensating payments may explain why a m ultilateral approach has not been used to date, despite the ine ciencies created by bilateral bargaining.
2209 observations, with 167 countries having data on all variables for at least one year. It includes countries which existed earlier but not later in the sample U.S.S.R, and countries which existed later but not earlier in the sample Kazakhstan. From the FCC, Statistics of Communications Common Carriers, we obtained data for the U.S.
versus each other country j on minutes called in each direction, denoted Q ij , and settlement p a yments in each direction, denoted S ij . From the same source, we also obtained U.S. carrier revenue from country j, denoted REV ij . Population for each country, P O P j , i s t a k en from the March 1998 IMF's International Financial Statisitcs IFS database. We obtained real per-capita income, for each country j denoted M j , using the Summers and Heston Penn World Table, issue 5.6, which measures the gross domestic product per-capita in 1985 U.S. dollars converted at PPP exchange rates. This series ended in 1992; we updated it by splicing it to a 1985 constant price GDP from the IFS database, converted into U.S. dollars based on the market exchange rate in 1985, and divided by P O P j . We also obtained the 1985 GDP price de ator for the U.S. from IFS, denoted C P I t . Data on distance was taken from the Web site www.indo.com.distance, which calculates the air-distance between any two cities in the world. The distance between the U.S. and a country j is denoted DIST j . The distance is the shortest distance between either New York city or Los Angeles, and the closest available city i n the foreign country. When distance is unavailable for a particular country it is assumed to be equal to the distance to the closest neighbouring country with available data. The area of each country, AREA j , is taken from the 
An Empirical Investigation of Settlement Rates
This section uses the data described above to investigate the determinants of settlement rates. We construct the average per-minute price of calls from the U. Table 4 gives some summary statistics on the variables used in the regressions below. DIST j is the distance between the U.S. and country j, measured in thousands of kilometres. ln P O P j;t measures the natural logarithm of the population meaured in tens of millions of people in country j. ln AREA j;t measures the natural logarithm of the area measured in thousands of square kilometres in country j. DC t is the share of U.S. net revenue from international calls that is not taken by A T&T. C O M P j;t is the number of competing rms in country j, operating in the international market C O M P j;t = 1 means there is a monopoly. F C j;t is 1 if there is foreign competition, and 0 otherwise.
The correlation coe cients suggest retail prices and settlement rates are highly correlated. Both these variables are postively correlated with distance and income disparity, and negatively correlated with domestic and foreign competition. However, these summary statistics mask interesting dynamic changes, such a s t h e increase in domestic competition over the sample, the emergence of foreign competition from 1993 onwards, and the steady decrease in retail prices and settlement rates throughout the sample period in 1985 U.S. dollars, the average retail price fell from $3.75 per-minute in 1980 to $0.70 in 1996, while the average settlement rate fell from $2.37 per-minute in 1980 to $0.46 in 1996. The dynamic aspects of the data are exploited below. The logarithmic transform is used for P O P j;t and AREA j , while C O M P j;t is transformed into the dummy v ariable F C j;t . Unscaled P O P j;t , AREA j;t , a n d C O M P j;t have v ery high levels of positive skewness and kurtosis, suggesting that without such scaling, results would be sensitive to the inclusion of outliers. With these scaled variables, all regressions below were checked for sensitivity to outliers. For each variable, we capped observations that were more than three standard deviations from their mean. This led to no qualitative c hange, and little quantitative c hange, in the results below.
One of the key relationships predicted by our model is the positive relationship between settlement rates and prices. Equation 3, which applies when there is no competition, implies P j;t = j;t + Rj;t 2 , where j;t = 1 2bj;t + cj;t 2 : To estimate this relationship, we run the xed e ects regression P j;t = i + t + R j;t + " j;t , which allows for di erent intercepts for each country and each year. The individual constants allow for the fact that the elasticity of demand b ij m a y di er depending on the country called, and that the cost of calls c ij will di er depending on the country called. The time-varying dummies allow for the fact, that over time, the cost of providing international calls has fallen, that competition in the U.S. has lowered prices, and that the elasticity of demand may h a ve c hanged over time. Using our sample of 2209 observations, the estimated equation is P j;t =^ i + t +^ R j;t , where^ = 0 :51 with a heteroskedastic-consistent standard error of less than 0:05 t-stat is 10:53. 19 The results show there is a highly signi cant and positive relationship between settlement rates and retail prices, and this relationship is very close to that predicted from our model equation 3, despite the fact data from competitive regimes is also included. 20 In fact, the hypothesis = 0 :5 cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of signi cance. This suggests that U.S. carriers pass on roughly one-half of any c hange in settlement rates. If one accepts this link between settlement rates and retail prices, an important question becomes, What determines settlement rates? 21 An important determinant of settlement rates, according to our theory of settlement rate determination, is income disparities. In particular, Table 1 suggests that the greater the absolute di erence between U.S. and foreign per-capita income jM j;t , M U S ; t j, the greater the settlement rate that will be agreed upon. We allow t h e strength of this relationship to di er depending on whether there is foreign competition or not. Our theory also suggests settlement rates should be increasing in the cost of carrying calls. We consider three di erent v ariables that proxy components of this cost. Firstly, the total cost of providing underwater cable is likely to be increasing in the distance of cable that has to be provided. Secondly, the greater is the population, the smaller is the per-minute cost of providing a given length of cable. Finally, for a given population, the greater the area of the country, t h e greater is the cost perminute of delivering the call to or taking the call from local customers. It is cheaper to deliver calls to one million densely populated households than the same number dispersed over a large area. 22 To the extent the cost of cable has fallen for a given volume of calls and the economies of scale in laying cable has fallen both underwater and across land, then distance, population, and area should all be decreasing in importance over time. Distance and area should also be decreasing in importance over time, as the volume of calls has increased over time, thus lowering the per-minute cost of covering additional distance or area. Finally, foreign competition could increase or decrease settlement rates, depending on whether carriers are restricted from reaching alternative settlement arrangements or not. We test these predictions by running a separate least squares regression for each y ear in the sample, as well as a regression on the means over the seventeen years of data.
The results from Table 5 con rm one of the main predictions of our model, that settlement rates are increasing in the income disparity b e t ween countries. The coefcient on income disparity is statistically signi cant at the 1 level in every year. The results suggest that an increase in income disparity of $1000 in 1985 increases the settlement rate by 5.6 cents; in 1996, the same increase leads to a 2.7 cent increase in the settlement rate when there is no competition in the foreign country, and a 0.9 cent increase in the settlement rate when there is competition in the foreign country. This latter result is consistent w i t h o u r s i m ulation results which found that foreign competition can sever the link between income disparities and settlement rates. Interestingly the reduction in the importance of income disparities for settlement r a t e s in the mid to late 1980s appears to coincide with the emergence of competition in the U.S. market. We nd further support for this proposition from time series regressions below. Table 5 suggests distance, population, and area are important determinants of settlement rates, although their importance diminishes over the sample, most likely because the costs that these variables proxy were falling over the sample period at least when measured on a per-minute basis. Of the three variables, distance appears to be the most important; it is statistically signi cant at the 1 level in every year, and a standard deviation shock to distance has a bigger impact on settlement rates than a standard deviation shock t o either population or area. The decline in the costs over the sample period, suggested by these results, is quite dramatic. In 1980, an extra 1000 kilometers in distance, increases the settlement rate by 19.3 cents, but by 1996, an extra 1000 kilometers in distance, increases settlement rates by only 3.2 cents. Similarly, in 1980 an extra one percent in area population, increases reduces the settlement rate by 10.7 cents 27.4 cents, but by 1996 the same increase, increases reduces the settlement r a t e b y only 0.5 cents 0.4 cents. Surprisingly, foreign competition is not a signi cant determinant of settlement r a t e s in these regressions. 23 These results suggest that reductions in costs could be a more important reason for the reduction in settlement rates over the period 1980-1996, than increases in competition. Developments such as settlement rate bypass and competition for call completion are relatively new phenomena, so most of their impact is most likely felt after the end of our sample. Note: All variables are de ned in Table 4 . Between is a means-on-means regression. Heteroskedasticconsistent standard errors are shown in parenthesis. Table 6 pools the data across years to extract additional information from the time variation in the data. Based on the results above, we allow t h e coe cient on income disparity to depend on the degree of domestic and foreign competition. We also allow the cost of calls to fall over time, by i n teracting distance, population, and area with time. Three regression models are considered: a pooled OLS regression, a xed e ects regression, and a random e ects regression. Note: Pooled OLS is a standard OLS regression using all available date, and allowing for time dummies; Fixed E ects is a standard panel regression, allowing for individual and time dummies; Random E ects assumes the country intercepts are drawn from a common distribution, but still allows for time dummies. All variables are de ned in Table 4 The results from exploiting the time series nature of the data mostly con rm those obtained from the separate single-year regressions above, but some di erences emerge. In all three regressions, settlement rates are increasing in income disparity, although the rate of increase, decreases with the extent of domestic competition. The signs on coe cients for distance, population, and area are the same as those found in Table  5 , although the magnitude of the coe cients falls. 24 Foreign competition emerges as a more important factor in lowering settlement rates, compared to the results from the cross-sectional regressions. According to the pooled OLS regression, the move t o multiple carriers in the foreign country reduces settlement rates by 8.2 cents, while with the xed and random e ects models, the fall in settlement rates is more than 18 cents. Thus, in contrast to Table 5 , these results suggest that the emergence of competition is a more important factor than cost reductions, in reducing settlement rates in the 1990s.
One of the less obvious implications of our bilateral bargaining theory of why i ncome disparity matters for settlement rates, is that the absolute value of the di erence between two countries incomes matters, rather than just the di erence in incomes. This implies, other things equal, settlement rates will be higher between a carrier in a middle-income country and a carrier in a high-income country, than between carriers which are both in middle-income countries. While the U.S. had the highest per-capita income in some of the later years in our sample, there were countries with higher per-capita incomes in earlier years. Using the pooled regression model, the additional variables M j;t ,M U S ; t ; M j;t ,M U S ; t DC t , and M j;t ,M U S ; t F C j;t are added to the model, and an F-test is conducted to test whether these three variables are jointly signi cant. Even at the 10 signi cance level, these variables cannot be rejected as insigni cant p-value is 0.71. In contrast, using the same unrestricted model, an F-test on the three variables jM j;t , M U S ; t j ; jM j;t , M U S ; t j DC t , and jM j;t , M U S ; t j F C j;t yields an F-stat of 14.57 p-value is 0.00, thus supporting this implication of the theory. A more powerful test of this implication could be achieved using settlement rate data from a middle-income country. In this case, results based on just the level of foreign income, as opposed to the absolute value of the deviation, should yield starkly di erent conclusions.
As well as the variables directly implied by our theory of settlement rate determination, we also considered three other less obvious variables. Per-capita gross domestic product is unlikely to be a perfect measure of households ability to spend on international phone calls. A better measure, especially for countries with a lot of income inequality, maybe the median household income. Unfortunately, this is not available. Instead, we consider two variables that may be correlated with income inequality. P O L R I G H T 6 j is an index of political rights from 1 to 7; 1=most freedom, taken from the Barro-Lee 1994 data set and based on the average over 1985-89. P I N S T A B 5 j is a measure of political instability the average of the number of assassinations per million per year and the numberofrevolutions per year, taken from the Barro-Lee 1994 data set and based on the average over 1980-84. Appending these two v ariables to the pooled OLS model above, the estimates on the other variables remain largely unchanged, while the coe cient o n P O L R I G H T 6 j is signi cant. 25 The results suggest countries where there are few political rights, have higher settlement rates. To the extent income is less equal in countries with repressive political regimes, this supports the argument that income inequality also matters. A one-standard deviation increase in political repressiveness raises the settlement r a t e b y nearly 13 cents. Settlement rates could also be higher with repressive g o vernments if such countries have greater bargaining power in settlement rate negotiations. This assumes, as is likely the case, these are low-income countries which, therefore, want high settlement rates. 26 Another variable that was found to be signi cant when appended to our 25 We lose 264 observations when adding these two v ariables. The coe cient o n PO L R I G H T6 is 0.056 with a standard errror of 0.008. The coe cient o n P I N S T A B 5 is -0.037 with a standard error of 0.065. 26 What implications does this paper have f o r t h e F CC mandates and multilateral policy options? Our bilateral bargaining model of settlement rates helps understand the perspective o f t h e F CC. The FCC has detailed benchmarks which g o vern the maximal settlement rates that U.S. carriers may p a y foreign carriers to terminate international tra c originating in the U.S. The principle behind these rules is to bring settlement rates, and therefore retail prices, more closely in line with costs, thus reducing the settlement imbalances between the U.S. and these countries, and increasing overall e ciency. This principle is consistent with the ndings from our modelling. When settlement rates are set at the marginal cost of carrying incoming calls, rather than on the carriers relative bargaining power, retail prices are lower, e ciency is increased, and the imbalance in settlement p a yments is reduced. We nd the bene ts of moving to cost based settlement rates are largest when there is competition in the U.S. but no competition in the foreign country, and the greater the di erence in income levels across the two c o u n tries. However, our model casts some doubt on whether these rules will be e ective. According to our model, since the underlying bargaining problem remains unchanged, so should the outcome to bargaining. It is not obvious how t h e FCC rules will enable U.S. carriers to unilaterally achieve l o wer settlement rates in negotiation with foreign carriers. Our model suggests a multilateral approach to settlement rate determination, as has been suggested by the World Trade Organisation, could be bene cial. Any individual country, except the highest and lowest income countries, pro ts from, as well as su ers costs caused by, high settlement rates. Nevertheless, given it bargains with raising revenue than consumer welfare. Since they have c o n trol over the national carrier, this is re ected in the carrier preferring even higher settlement rates than their income di erence would suggest. 27 Using an F-test on the pooled OLS model with the reduced sample size, we cannot reject that the coe cients on the remaining variables, other than a constant term, are unchanged after the introduction of PO L R I G H T6 j , P I N S T A B 5 j , a n d LINES j;t ; t h e p -v alue from this test is 0.966.
The introduction of these three variables leads to a slight increase in the importance of income and foreign competition, and a slight decrease in the importance of the three cost measures. We a l s o included these variables in our other regressions and reached similar conclusions. These variables are not considered as part of our benchmark model as data is not available for all observations, the political variables are not directly suggested by our model, and the variable LINES j;t is likely to be endogenous.
bilaterally, a middle-income country will still press for high settlement rates with higher income countries. The net result will be higher world-wide settlement rates and lower aggregate welfare. By acting multilaterally, each country except those with the lowest income will bene t from lower settlement rates. This suggests there is an ine ciency generated by each c o u n try forming agreements in a bilateral fashion.
To implement a multilateral approach in practice, the lowest income countries would need to receive some compensating payments to ensure their participation. Without the participation of the lowest income countries, the next lowest income countries would achieve no bene t from a multilateral reduction in settlement rates, and the whole process would unravel. A further question, concerning a multilateral approach, is whether in the long-run it may actually impede competition? An alternative to a multilateral cooperative approach and the FCC's mandates, is the abandonment o f g o vernment regulations on international carriers and the opening up of markets to competition. Once retail competition is achieved, government rules such as proportional return rules and common settlement rates, may serve to only increase settlement rates and hinder competition. To a c hieve truly cost based retail prices, carriers should be allowed to compete with each other for call settlement. Existing international carriers have the most to lose from such competition and may well argue for multilateral agreements and rules which e ectively sti e competition for call settlement. 28 This suggests a two-tiered approach m a y be optimal; encourage competition over call completion by permitting alternative settlement arrangements to develop between countries which h a ve more than one carrier o ering international telephone services; and where competition does not develop, promote multilateral rather than bilateral negotiations which a l l o w all countries to lower settlement r a t e s and improve welfare, with only the carriers in the lowest-income countries needing compensation for losses.
Our empirical results give one justi cation for the FCC's approach o f h a ving higher benchmark rates for carriers in low-income countries. The justi cation is that the adjustment t o t h e F CC benchmark rates will be greater for low-income countries since they start from higher levels of settlement rates. A more appropriate approach, to the extent costs are the same across countries, is to impose a common benchmark rate for all countries, but with di erent glide paths to this common rate. Carriers in lowincome countries would be allowed more time to adjust, given their di erent starting points. This is a feature of the FCC mandates; carriers in low-income countries are allowed three extra years to adjust to their prescribed benchmark rates compared to carriers in high-income countries.
If distance captures a component of the cost of providing international telecommunication services between countries, then this suggests that distance should also be re ected in the FCC benchmark rates. In fact, this has been suggested by the U.S. carrier Sprint. According to the International Settlement Rates Report and Order, I B lower than in the monopoly case. The results also suggest the link between income disparity and settlement rates is severed. This may be an implication of proportional return. When there is a substantial income di erential, retail prices in the low-income country are actually decreasing in the settlement rate from simulations with the above parameter values and c j = d j = 0:1, j = 1, then provided 0:83 m j 1; retail prices are increasing in the settlement rate for all positive settlement rates, but for lower levels of m j , retail prices in country j are decreasing in the settlement rate for some positive settlement rates. This can be explained as follows. With a h i g h settlement rate, carriers in the low-income country earn a disproportionate amount from settlement p a yments from the high-income country. Under proportional return, each carrier captures more incoming calls only by increasing their share of outgoing calls. Thus, the higher the settlement rate, the greater the pressure for each carrier to undercut the other in the retail market, and the lower retail prices will be. This pressure is more pronounced in the low-income country where a greater proportion of pro ts come from settlement r e v enue on incoming calls. Simulations suggest this is particularly true for the new entrant carrier b in the low-income country, as this carrier starts with only a small share of the market. For such a carrier, when decreasing its retail price, the loss in revenue from existing customers is less signi cant compared to the gain from generating more outgoing calls, thus achieving lucrative settlement r e v enue. This e ect tends to o set the standard e ect from lower income, thus breaking the earlier link between an asymmetry in income and settlement rates. Table 1 and 2. In addition, i = 1 and s ji is the share of customers in country j that use carrier a in country j.
